The traditional focus on regulation within the health sector has been on standard-setting, e.g. ensuring minimum levels of quality and safety. This approach, often called 'social', can be distinguished from the more 'economic' approach, which looks at the role of regulation in the context of markets (Ogus 1994) . However, the extent to which existing regulations reflect current realities is unknown, particularly in developing countries about which there is very little literature.
In response to this gap, the 1995 meeting of the PublicPrivate Mix Collaborative Research Network (PPMNet) 1 developed a comparative research framework to explore these issues. This paper reports results from studies undertaken in two countries: Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The general objective of the work was to assess existing regulatory mechanisms and to use this information to feed into policy development. The specific objectives of the overall research were to:
• describe the existing network of regulations within the health sector; • assess the effectiveness of the particular regulations and to identify factors influencing effectiveness; • explore different groups' perceptions of existing regulatory interventions.
Specifically, this paper outlines the findings of the first phase of research which was a mapping exercise undertaken in both of the countries in order to ascertain the nature of existing regulatory instruments employed to influence the private health sector.
The paper is organized as follows: the first section reviews what is meant by regulation, particularly in a low-income context. This is followed by a description of the context of the two countries, and a review of the existing regulations in place in each country. The next section summarizes and discusses the findings in the light of what is known about experience in other low-income countries, identifying some common gaps. The paper ends with a discussion of priorities for further work.
Regulation: a framework for analysis
We begin by reviewing what is meant by regulation, and discussing a framework for the assessment of different types of regulatory instruments. Regulation occurs when government controls or deliberately tries to influence the activities of individuals or actors through manipulation of target variables such as price, quantity and quality (Maynard 1982; Kumaranayake 1998 ).
The extensive size of private sector activity and deliberate policies promoting it have led to the increasing 'marketization' of the health sector and a concomitant role for stronger regulation (Bennett et al. 1997) . In simple terms a market occurs when there is an exchange between buyers and sellers. While the market for health is not a typical market, and is characterized by imperfections, the use of market analysis from economic theory can give insight into the changing roles and nature of health sectors across the world. Market analysis suggests a broader set of variables and roles for regulation within the health sector. For example, in addition to the standard setting, social role of regulation, there is now greater need to consider issues such as anti-competitive practices taking place within the health market.
Figure 1 presents an analytical framework by which to consider the changing nature of regulation. It reflects the additional market or economic roles that regulation may now need to play, given private sector activity (Kumaranayake and Lake 1998 what to regulate, who to regulate and how to regulate. The figure shows three levels 2 at which target variables may be addressed by regulation, together with the nature of the instruments used. The 'what to regulate' is reflected by a range of target variables, described in terms of entry, quantity, quality, price, distribution and competitive practices. In economic terms, the choice of 'who' to regulate must now encompass successively complex levels in the provision of services, addressing individual inputs, such as solo physician practices, to organizations, such as hospitals, nursing homes or pharmacies, and then to the broader question of the market in general. Markets are an additional level that results from the interaction of agents buying and selling health services. The levels are obviously linked (i.e. combinations of inputs create organizations) and a number of organizations co-exist in the market. The 'how' to regulate refers to the instruments used to affect these variables, and is described later in the section.
The target variables can apply at different levels and are aimed at different actors within the health sector. Entry refers to initial acceptance into the market. There are issues regarding entry at each level or organization:
• individual inputs: the selection of personnel, drugs, or medical equipment; • organization: licensing of facilities and clinics; • overall market level: e.g. the promotion of competition and contestability.
Quantity regulation can be used to affect the volume of inputs in health service provision (e.g. certificate of need laws restricting purchase of equipment or facility development); to restrict the number of organizations (e.g. limitations on the number of private clinics within a given area); and to promote an increased number of providers in the market through antimonopoly legislation. Quality regulation refers to the earlier notion of standard-setting and quality assurance, and covers such areas as quality control of drugs and approved curricula for the training of health professionals. Price regulation includes the articulation of minimum salary levels of health workers or the setting of fees for the provision of particular health services. Regulations addressing distribution issues can relate to the locating of health professionals in underserved areas. Regulations that relate to competitive practices aim to directly influence the way people compete within a private market and any adverse practices that might result from this. In practice, these areas may overlap -for example regulations aimed at ensuring a minimal quality of a service or good in a market also work to restrict entry into the market.
The third dimension in Figure 1 is the 'how' of regulating and refers to the manner in which regulation is undertaken, i.e. the nature of the regulatory instruments. These instruments range from formal legal controls enacted through legislation, where there are sanctions if the regulations are not followed, to more informal codes of practice or policy guidelines. The extent to which official codes of practice are seen as regulation depends on the extent to which there are any enforcement mechanisms attached to them. A second broad way of regulating is through the creation of incentives, both financial (whether a tax or a subsidy) and non-financial, aimed at encouraging participants to change their behaviour. A more formalized approach to incentives is seen in the use of incentive regulation, which can be thought of as rules which use verifiable outcomes such as market prices to affect individual participant's behaviour (e.g. prices can only rise by some proportion of market price). This is often seen in the regulation of former public sector utilities (energy, telecommunications) in industrialized countries (Abbott and Crew 1995) .
Context
Both Tanzania and Zimbabwe are currently undergoing broad restructuring of the health sector. This follows a fairly typical pattern, including the mobilization of additional sources of finance such as the introduction of user fees and insurance, and organizational reforms such as the decentralization of resources and management responsibilities to the district level.
In both countries, there has been a policy of encouraging private sector provision of health. This has been accompanied by narrowing the focus of government away from direct service provision and towards strengthening the traditional policy-setting role and developing its facilitatory role in an increasingly diverse sector. Both countries are characterized by significant non-profit (particularly mission) activity within the health sector, but for the purposes of this analysis, we focus on the for-profit health sector.
Zimbabwe
In the decade after independence, Zimbabwe invested considerable public resources in health, population, nutrition and education. The overall focus of government policy was growth with equity, particularly removing systemic biases in favour of the colonial minority. The 1980-90 period saw a marked increase in real health expenditure. The beginning of the 1990s saw a decline in the performance of the economy characterized by problems of unemployment, high inflation and interest rates, low investment and high government expenditure and budget deficits (currently estimated to be in excess of 11% of GDP) and increasing national debt.
In 1991, Zimbabwe embarked on an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Consequently, resource allocation in the social sectors started to decline considerably in real terms, and there was a greater focus on cost recovery in the social sectors and more investment into non-social sectors of the economy. It is against this background that Zimbabwe embarked on an ambitious programme of public sector reforms. Health sector reforms were kick-started by the results of a Public Service Review in 1987 that undertook an in-depth assessment of public service procedures. This review showed that the public service was inefficient and required rationalization. Between 1991 and 1996, the civil service was to be cut by 23 500 people, or more than 10%. Health sector reform proposals focused on strengthening management and organization, health financing, contracting out, regulation of the private sector and decentralization of health services (MoHCW 1995) . The most dramatic change to be introduced has been the introduction of health service decentralization and the most significant change within the health sector in Zimbabwe has been the rapid emergence of private sector activity.
One reason for this expansion is a deliberate change in government policy to encourage private sector partnership, in light of the government's resource constraints. This has led to a relaxing of rules allowing public employees to operate in the private sector. The government saw this as a way of increasing the provision of services, and allowing scarce public resources to be diverted to other needy areas, in particular a shift towards more rural and preventative health care in government expenditures. The burgeoning number of private sector providers has been seen as a means of increasing access to and coverage of health services.
The private medical sector has now started to play a significant role in health services delivery. In 1993 it was estimated that about 92% of health services in Zimbabwe were provided by government health institutions, 5% by mission hospitals and NGOs, and the remainder by the private-for-profit sector. By 1996, about 45% of registered doctors were estimated to work full time in the private sector, 56% of whom were based in Harare (Hongoro et al. 2000) . The growth of the private sector has been aided by an increase in the number of people taking up private health insurance. Medical Aid Societies in Zimbabwe cater for about 800 000 beneficiaries, representing about 10% of the potential contributors who are formally employed.
Tanzania
Post-independence Tanzania gave high priority to education and health, with a prominent role for the government as a provider. In 1967 the government of Tanzania, through the Arusha Declaration, committed itself to a policy of providing essential health care services free at the point of use. This was financed both through government and external donor resources. Private practice in the health sector was actively discouraged, and in 1977 was prohibited by law, although the actual consequences of this were to mask private sector activity rather than actually ending it (Mujinja et al. 1993) .
However, by the mid-1980s, Tanzania was facing economic constraints. In 1985-86 Tanzania embarked on a policy of economic liberalization and by the end of the 1980s, resources for the health sector had been substantially reduced, with real per capita expenditure falling by 46% in the decade to 1988/89. One consequence of this was the removal of the prohibition on private medical practice in 1991 as part of a broader set of government policy reforms introduced to encourage private initiative. Individuals were now allowed to establish, own and manage health care facilities and services, and following this change, private health sector activity increased dramatically. It was estimated that between 1991 and 1996 there was a 36-fold increase in the number of private for-profit dispensaries and that the number of for-profit hospitals increased five-fold (Munishi 1997 ).
This recent increase in private sector activity has taken place within the context of broader sectoral reforms presented by the Ministry of Health in 1994 (URT 1994). These focus on the articulation of district health plans, broadening the range of financing options, and 'continuous revision of the implementation of various acts, ordinances and regulations pertaining to health management and administration' (URT 1994). In contrast to the past, the private sector is explicitly seen as a partner rather than an opponent, complementing government provision and widening consumer choice. However, the reform documents stress the need for a 'strong regulatory authority' to monitor the supply, quality and geographical distribution of health services and industries such as pharmaceuticals.
Methods
The aim of the research in this first phase was to understand the framework of existing health sector regulations facing private for-profit providers in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. As there were only limited attempts to distinguish between private and public providers in the legislation encountered, the review focused on the main legislation which was thought to potentially affect the private health sector. In Zimbabwe, the study also considered the public health Acts that might affect private providers. Two methods of information collection were used. First, a review of existing regulations within the health sector was undertaken at national level with the hope of establishing a basic mapping of the existing network of regulations for each country. Information was collected through a review of existing documents and legislation. These data were then supplemented with data obtained through structured interviews with key stakeholders. The outcome of this stage was a description of the existing regulations addressing the health sector, discussed in terms of:
• the types of variables being targeted (e.g. salaries, standards, etc.); • the specific interventions (e.g. licensing, incentives); • whom the regulations affect (e.g. the level: physicians, facilities).
During the process of information collection, we also tried to note what are the main gaps, in light of the changes in the health sector. Much of the review focused on regulation by legislation, and related administrative bodies empowered to implement them, as this was by and large the main type of regulation currently in place. The detailed country analysis is found in Hongoro et al. (2000) and Mujinja et al. (1998) .
How do they regulate?
Tables 1 and 2 present the detailed mapping of the main legislation affecting the health sector in the two countries. In Tanzania, the majority of the legislation was more than 20 years old. All but one of these regulations was legally based. The legislation in Zimbabwe has been more recently updated, with three of the ten pieces of legislation being changed or enacted since 1996.
The legislation in both countries was then categorized by the variables targeted, the level (individuals, institutions or markets) and by the manner of regulation used. In both countries the majority of the regulations focus on entry (licensing) requirement for health personnel, such as medical and dental practitioners, nurses and midwives, pharmacists, as well as drugs and other medical devices. The entry restrictions work through specifying a minimal level of quality, below which individuals and organizations cannot enter the market. Thus, entry will also be implicitly controlling quantity, although there are no explicit intentions to deliberately influence the supply of these personnel. Zimbabwe also has an act designed to regulate traditional practitioners. The quality restrictions are aimed at ensuring a minimum basic standard, below which entry is restricted.
Similar to regulations at the input level, there are existing regulations for the entry and quality of health facilities. Generally there is mandatory registration of hospitals and clinics. But regulations relating to other forms of facilities, such as nursing homes and mental institutions, are not systematically found. The major changes with respect to the growing 'marketization' of the health sector have reflected the need to regulate private hospitals/facilities. In Tanzania, there was the passage of the Private Hospitals Act (1991) and the Amendments to the Pharmaceuticals and Poisons Regulations in 1990. These changes essentially legalized private practice for pharmacists, hospitals and medical practitioners. Legislation in Tanzania restricts registering of new private pharmacies in areas where it is deemed there is an adequate number (distribution), but it is not clear that this happens in practice. In Zimbabwe, the Medical Services Act (1998) gives authority to the Minister of Health to regulate a wide variety of practices and actors related to the private for-profit sector. However, no specific measures have been identified or put into practice.
Regulations become more limited, as the nature of the variables and the level becomes more complex. In terms of the price variable, there are very few regulations. In Tanzania there is an Act regulating salaries of physicians and determination of price structures for private facilities. Nothing has been explicitly aimed at improving competitive practices. At the market level, there is very little regulation found, except for the sale and importing of drugs into the local markets. In terms of competitive practices, Tanzania has no explicit protection for the consumer, as found in places such as India with its Consumer Protection Act. This Act attempts to protect consumers (e.g. patients) in transactions purchasing medical care (Bhat 1996) . Figure 2 summarizes the main findings according to these categories. The bottom right quadrants represent the most complex parts of a potential regulatory framework, focusing on market structures and competitive practices.
It is quite clear that much of the existing legislation reflects the still more 'social' dimensions of standard-setting for entry and quality, with new legislation starting to reflect the need to address private actors in the health sector. However, even this legislation is still somewhat focused on entry and minimum quality and some price regulation functions, as opposed to broader measures attempting to discipline the market, promote competitive practices and consumer protection.
In order to understand the impact of these regulations, it is clearly important to explore their enforcement and effectiveness. This is looked at in more detail in the country-specific publications (Mujinja et al. 1999; Hongoro et al. 2000) .
Where are the gaps? Figure 1 provided a summary of the nature of the regulations which are now needed as governments come to address private sector activity. The figure provided a range of categorization by level and nature of instrument. In Figure 2 , we summarized the type of legislation that was actually found in our review of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. We now consider what may be the most important gaps in existing regulation, in light of our knowledge of the changing nature of the health sector. Relative to the growing marketization of the health sector, there are a large number of gaps identified in terms of the focus of existing legislation and target variables. The existence of documented problems suggests the need for action not only at the entry stage, but also on the broader distribution and competitive practices dimensions, particularly on the market side. Examples of these problems and noteworthy gaps are summarized in Table 3 .
Private sector activity is not confined to health care practitioners alone. There is also a range of other private sector providers who are apparent in these countries. In terms of entry, there is a growing need to recognize new private sector actors (e.g. laboratories, other health care staff) in both thinking about minimum standards for entry and ensuring quality. In terms of more 'economic' type regulation, key areas identified for more focus are at the organization/ market level and on new types of markets such as the rapidly increasing private insurance industry, and issues related to entry and quality.
Given the nature of private transactions, problems also arise due to the lack of restrictions on competitive practices. Public practitioners working in private practice also engender a Hongoro et al. (2000) .
whole host of problems, including leakage of supplies and pharmaceuticals from public facilities. In Zimbabwe, the additional problem of self-referral -with physicians owning private facilities such as laboratories where patients are sent -has been documented (Hongoro et al. 2000) . This type of ownership can be thought of as vertically integrating certain services, reducing competition and potentially increasing costs. In the context of the broader market, consumers have very little protection (unlike India) apart from the existing negligence/malpractice provisions governing the licensing of medical practitioners.
Conclusions
The growing marketization of the health sector requires newly defined and strengthened roles for the state. In terms of regulation, the challenge is to have both appropriately designed and effective measures given changing realities. In this paper, we consider the first issue and explore what is the nature of current health sector regulation in Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and how they reflect changing realities. Findings indicate that much of the existing regulation occurs through legislation and:
(1) focuses on individual inputs rather than health system organizations; (2) aims to control entry and quality rather than explicitly quantity, price or distribution; (3) fails to address the market-level problems of anticompetitive practices and lack of patient rights.
It has been argued that one needs to have basic legal mechanisms in place relatively early on in the marketization process, as it is much harder to do so later. In order to keep pace with the new realities of the health sector, there is much that still needs to be done. Emerging markets require the emergence of appropriate regulations. However, these tend not to keep pace. As the private sector develops and becomes more formalized, coalitions of interest emerge, and then it becomes very difficult to put into place basic regulatory legislation which works against vested private sector interests. Even though the extent of private health insurance is small at the moment, experience from countries such as Thailand and the United States suggests that it is virtually impossible to implement legislation for private health insurance once the industry is well established. While we have examined Tanzania and Zimbabwe in detail, the nature of existing regulation is for regulation and other measures need for regulation addressing to strengthen consumer protection this similar to many low-income countries also facing extensive private sector activity.
There is still very much a focus on the 'social' rather than 'economic' aspects of regulation within the health sector. Although there have been recent changes which attempt to start to address aspects of private health provision, there are some very key gaps. These particularly include measures to promote consumer protection and to address the development of new private markets such as for health insurance or laboratory and other ancillary services.
However, the other key question is about whether these regulations are effective, and if they do have limited impact, can and how do we address the gaps identified by the existing network of regulations? Secondly, as the objectives and levels of regulation change within the health sector, is the nature of the instruments differentially important for different levels and organizations? These questions relate not only to the variables and levels that regulations are targeting, but also to the 'how' of the process. Further work needs to be done in identifying successful cases of effective implementation of regulation, and considering non-legal mechanisms to meet these objectives.
Endnotes
1 The PPMNet is a network of collaborative research partners working together since 1993. It currently consists of 14 members from around the world. The network is funded by the European Union.
2 The term 'level' in Figure 1 refers to the degree of complexity in organization, rather than the usual primary, secondary and tertiary levels associated with the health system.
